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Can anti-corruption policies curb political budget cycles? Evidence from public employment in Brazil

Prior research has established that politicians often manipulate public resources before elections to win votes. Much less is known about the effects of policies designed to constrain such behavior. I argue that laws limiting politicians' discretion …

Street-level rule of law: Prosecutor presence and the fight against corruption

Prosecutors are central figures in the fight against corruption and the rule of law more broadly. Yet we lack systematic evidence about whether they are effective at reducing corruption and, if so, why. I argue that prosecutors' use of autonomy and …

Internal Control as State Capacity

While previous research has examined the effects of horizontal accountability institutions such as courts or external audits, we know much less about the origins and consequences of internal control institutions in the public sector. I argue that …

Information, oversight, and compliance: A field experiment on horizontal accountability in Brazil

Does the provision of information about local bureaucracies to the politicians who oversee them decrease irregularities and improve bureaucratic effectiveness? Information interventions are appealing because of their solid microeconomic foundations …

Franchise reforms in the age of migration: Why do governments enfranchise noncitizens?

This article examines the enfranchisement of noncitizens and seeks to explain governments' decisions about whether to include or exclude them from the vote. By focusing on the incentives behind incumbents' decisions, the article argues that …